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Transportation Biohazard Operational ConceptApplication of Technology to Transportation Operations in Biohazard SituationsFederal Highway Administration August 31, 2005 PrefaceIn 2004 and 2005, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and the Intelligent Transportation Systems Joint Program Office (ITS-JPO) conducted a project called Application of Technology to Transportation Operations in Biohazard Situations. The goal of this project was to develop a more comprehensive and actionable understanding of the role of transportation during a biohazard emergency so that communities across the country can better plan for, respond to, and recover from such an incident. This Transportation Biohazard Operational Concept was prepared as part of that project. It builds on the results of an extensive literature review, a dedicated program of outreach with members of the affected transportation, emergency management, public health and public safety communities, and a validation workshop conducted in July 2005 and sponsored by the Wisconsin Department of Transportation. This operational concept was used to develop a set of recommended practices and a learning tool for state Departments of Transportation (DOTs). The operational concept was also be presented to the National Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) Architecture Team for consideration in defining addition functional requirements and user service agreements. FHWA and ITS-JPO would like to thank the members of American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) Special Committee on Transportation Security (SCOTS) for their support in reviewing earlier drafts of the operations concept. We would also like to extend our special thanks to Mr. Jeffrey Western of the Wisconsin Department of Transportation for hosting the validation workshop, and for sharing with the research team the activities being performed in Wisconsin to address biohazard events. Transportation Biohazard Operational Concept
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| Disease | Incubation Period | Symptoms | Spread (person to person) | Lethality if untreated | Persistence of Organism | Vaccine Status (as of March 2005) | Medical Treatment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HIGH THREAT AGENTS (CATEGORY a) | |||||||
| Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis) (inhalational) | typically 1–6 days, | Fever, cough, profound sweats | No (only skin form spreads) | High (if inhaled) viable in soil >40 years | Very stable spores | Licensed | Antibiotics |
| Plague (Yersinia pestis) | 1–7 days | Fever, cough, shortness of breath, (usually 2–3 days) sore lymph nodes | Moderate | High unless treated within 12-24 hours (pneumonic) | For up to 1 year in soil; 270-days in live tissue | Not current | Antibiotics |
| Tularemia (Francisella tularensis) | 1–21 days (avg 3–6) | Fever, cough, pneumonia, headache | No | Moderate | For months in moist soil or other media | Not current | Antibiotics |
| Marburg(Viral hemorrhagic fever) | 4–21 days | Sudden onset, fever, headache, followed by vomiting and diarrhea, rash, generalized bleeding in severe cases | Via fluids | >25% lethal | Relatively unstable | None | Supportive treatment only |
| Ebola (Viral hemorrhagic fever) | 4–21 days | Sudden onset, fever, headache, followed by vomiting and diarrhea, rash, generalized bleeding in severe cases | Via fluids | 50-80% lethal | Relatively unstable | Investigational | Supportive treatment only |
| Smallpox (Variola major virus) | 7–17 days (avg 12) | Fever, aches, after 2–4 days rash appears | Moderate | High to moderate >30% lethal | Very stable | Licensed | Supportive |
| Botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxin) | 12 hours–5 days | Muscle paralyzing illness | No | High without respiratory support | Stable for weeks in nonmoving food/water | Licensed (availability uncertain) | Antitoxin if administered quickly |
| LOWER THREAT AGENTS (SELECTED CATEGORY B AGENTS) | |||||||
| Cholera ( Vibrio cholerae) | 4 hours–5 days | Sudden onset of voluminous (usually 2–3 days) watery diarrhea, vomiting, cramps, dehydration | Rare, although spreads rapidly via untreated water | Low with treatment, high without | Unstable in aerosols & fresh water, stable in salt water | Investigational | Antibiotics |
| Glanders (Burkholderia mallel) | 1–14 days via aerosol | Pneumonia with or without blood poisoning, ulcers in nose, mouth, throat and lungs | No | Death in 7-10 days in blood poisoning form | Very stable | None | Antibiotics |
| Q fever (Coxiella burnetii) | 7–41 days | Flu-like illness that can lead to pneumonia and hepatitis | No | Very low | For months on wood and sand | Not licensed in U.S. | Antibiotics |
| Encephalitis (Alphaviruses) | 2–6 days | Fever, aches, pain behind the eye, nausea, vomiting | Low | Low | Relatively unstable | None | Supportive treatment |
| Ricin (Ricinus communis) | 18–24 hours | Can shut down organ function | No | High (injected) | Stable supportive treatment | Investigational | No antidote |
| * Incubation periods listed are for naturally occurring outbreaks, which could differ for agents used as weapons. Data for incubation period, lethality, and persistency from U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases Blue Book, August 2004. | |||||||
Types of Biohazard Events
Transportation agencies are most concerned about four broad categories of biohazard events:
- deliberate release directed at humans,
- agroterrorism,
- accidental release, and
- natural occurrence.
Each of these is discussed below.
Deliberate Release
A deliberate release of a biohazard directed at humans is generally recognized to be the type of biohazard event that poses the greatest risk to human health and national security. Such an event could be overt (immediately recognized) or covert (unrecognized at the time of release).
An overt biohazard event might be identified by the following:
previous intelligence; a threat of action or post-event claim of responsibility, and direct evidence, such as powder residue or equipment used to release the bioagent, gathered at the release site. The response in an overt situation could be immediate, increasing the chances of limiting those exposed. First responders would be those traditionally involved in an emergency – police, firefighters, and Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel.
In a covert attack, there is often no forewarning, making the prediction of when and how an attack might occur impossible. Due to the delayed onset of most diseases caused by bioagents, there might be no indication of intentional release until days or even weeks after it occurred. Exposed individuals likely would begin to report generic symptoms accompanied by a fever to healthcare personnel at local hospital and medical centers.
For a deliberate attack on people, biological agents could be disseminated in one or more of the following ways:
- Aerosol dissemination is the dispersal of an agent in air from sprayers or other devices. An aerosol attack might take place outdoors in a populated area or indoors, e.g., in the ventilation system of a building, in the subway, on planes.
- Food or water, especially ready-to-eat food (vegetables, salad bars) could be intentionally contaminated with pathogens or toxins. The water supply is less vulnerable because dilution, filtration, and the addition of chlorine can kill most disease-causing organisms.
- Human carriers could spread transmissible agents by coughing, through body fluids, or by contaminating surfaces. Most agents would make people ill or incapacitated before they become highly contagious, thereby reducing transmission of the disease.
- Infected animals can cause people to become ill through contact with the animals or contaminated animal products.
- Insects naturally spread some agents such as plague bacteria (vector borne illnesses) and potentially could be used in an attack.
- Physically distributed through the U.S. mail or other means.
Agroterrorism
Agroterrorism describes the deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease with the goal of generating fear, causing economic losses, and/or undermining stability. The results of this type of attack can include major economic crises, loss of confidence in food supplies and government protections, and possibly human casualties. Agricultural biohazard agents (e.g., foot and mouth disease, avian influenza, soy bean rust, etc.) do not have to be aerosolized to be effectively disseminated. The introduction of an infected plant or animal or its fluids could spread disease through the rest of the crop or livestock.
Accidental Release
An accidental release of biohazards could occur by mishandling of biomedical waste or an accident associated with a laboratory that studies contagious diseases or biological threats. These releases may involve accidents during transportation of waste material, damage to laboratory facilities where diseases are studied, or accidental release of laboratory animals infected with diseases. A recent example of a lab-related accidental release occurred last year when three lab workers at a Boston University research facility contracted tularemia after being exposed to the virus through their research. The public was not informed of the accidental release until three months after tularemia was confirmed as the infectious source.
Some accidental releases have been tied to military bioweapons programs. For example, an ecological research ship passed within nine miles of a smallpox testing site off the coast of the former Soviet Union in 1971. A single crew member became infected, presumably through inhalation of the disease, and carried the virus back to port. The Soviet government has never admitted to aerial smallpox testing; however, a 2002 report prepared by the Monterey Institute of International Studies suggests that an outbreak ensued, killing three people and infecting many, some of whom had been previously vaccinated. Hundreds were quarantined, and nearly 50,000 were vaccinated in response to the release. Travel to and from the port city was banned.
Despite the public hazards of an accidental release of a bioagent, the public health impact is likely to be less severe than for a deliberate release.
Accidental releases can also affect agriculture, contaminating livestock, crops and processed food.
Natural Occurrence
Bacteria, viruses, and biological toxins that are harmful to humans and animals frequently spread naturally through populations. When large populations are affected or biological responses are sufficiently severe, naturally occurring biohazard events can cause a major public health problem. Widespread natural outbreaks occur for a number of reasons, including the following:
- Natural mutations that make diseases resistant to existing vaccines or naturally occurring antibodies,
- Environmental conditions that favor the development of certain bioagents, and
- Natural cycles of disease agents.
Another naturally occurring biohazard source is the mishandling and improper sanitation of food and water. In the case of food, a single source such as a restaurant that fails to thoroughly cook its meat could cause a localized threat to public health. Contaminated food could also originate from a single feedlot or a cattle-dense region that distributes animal products across the country, potentially resulting in numerous, scattered outbreaks. Leaking septic systems or deficient water sanitation systems could cause water contamination, leading to localized biohazard events.
Overt biological attacks could be confused with naturally occurring outbreaks, especially in food-borne diseases and those spread by animals. The detection and identification process would be the same as described above for a deliberate release. However, in the event of a natural occurrence, the public health impact is likely to be less severe than for a deliberate release.
Modal Characteristics
State DOTs are typically responsible for multiple modes of transportation. Each mode has specific characteristics that affect its potential role in the release and spread of biohazards. These characteristics include the physical characteristics of the system and the way the system typically is used. The most important characteristics relate to the degree to which the system concentrates people, the distance and speed of travel, and mechanisms for controlled access.
The vulnerabilities of different modes supported and/or operated by state DOTs are presented in Figure 6.
Events of Greatest Concern
Based on the vulnerabilities identified in Figure 6, the biological agents of greatest concern to transportation network are:
- Airborne non-communicable threats such as anthrax, tularemia, and viral hemorrhagic fevers.
- Airborne communicable threats such as smallpox, plague, and bioengineered influenza.
- Introduction of infectious animal or plant diseases or viruses in shipped livestock and goods, e.g. BSE (Mad Cow disease, Foot and Mouth disease, etc.).
In addressing these threats, preparedness and response must be coordinated at all levels – local, state, and federal – to mitigate the effects of bioagents, to prevent morbidity and mortality, and to implement recovery operations.
During a biohazard event, the state DOT will be a supporting player, providing resources and services to state and local public health agencies, as well as hospitals and members of the outpatient medical community. These agencies will provide the initial detection and public health response. At the first suspicion of an intentional release of a disease-causing microbe or toxin, law enforcement agencies will be alerted.
The law enforcement function during a biohazard event will play a critical role in maintaining order and reducing panic among affected and potentially affected populations. State DOTs will coordinate with their partners in law enforcement and the National Guard to support activities that may be implemented to protect public health.
Figure 6: Modal Vulnerabilities to Biohazard Agents
| Biological Vulnerabilities | Highway | Transit | Aviation | Rail | Maritime |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enclosed Space | Passenger compartments and Tunnels | Passenger compartments, Tunnels, Stations and Terminals | Aircraft and Airport terminals | Railcars And Tunnels | Cruise ships |
| Potential for Persistent Contamination | Low | High for Stations and Passenger compartments | High for Airports and Aircraft | High for Stations, Passenger trains | High for Cruise ships, Terminals |
| Difficulty of Decontamination | Medium | High | High | Medium | Medium |
| Re-suspension of Deposited Contamination | High | High | High | High | Low |
| HVAC Spread Contamination | Traffic Management Centers, tunnels and rest stops | Within Passenger compartments, Terminals | Within Airports, Aircraft | Within Passenger car, Station | Cruise ship, Passenger terminals |
| Drinking Water Contamination | None | Passenger drinking water | Passenger drinking water | Passenger drinking water | Passenger drinking water |
| Ability to Contaminate Other Modes | Yes | Yes | Yes (Airports) | Yes | Yes (Docks) |
| Agricultural Cargo Contamination | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Transport Pathway Contamination | Yes (Roads) | Yes (Transit routes) | Yes (Airports) | Yes (Tracks) | Yes (Docks, Harbors, Canals, Rivers) |
Transportation Impacts of Public Health Response
To manage the public health impacts of a biohazard situation, the state DOT understands that the local and state public health, public safety, and emergency management communities have identified a set of activities that they would perform to identify, manage and resolve an outbreak resulting from a biohazard agent. In addition, the public health and agriculture/veterinary medicine communities have obtained legal and civil authorities for protecting public welfare, specified in state and local statutes. Using these authorities, local and state officials may:
- Isolate Symptomatic Individuals. In general, isolation refers to the separation of persons who have a specific infectious illness from those who are healthy and the restriction of their movement to stop the spread of that illness. Isolation is a standard procedure used in hospitals today for patients with tuberculosis and certain other infectious diseases.
- Implement Social Distancing. A relatively new approach to stemming the spread of communicable disease, social distancing imposes voluntary and mandatory restrictions on movement within a given geographic area. For example, an affected community may implement “snow emergency” conditions, canceling work, social events, and closing businesses, and encouraging citizens to remain in their homes.
- Order Quarantine. Generally refers to the separation and restriction of movement of persons who, while not yet ill, have been exposed to an infectious agent and therefore may become infectious. Quarantine is intended to stop the spread of infectious disease by preventing access to/egress from a specific area that may contain individuals who have been exposed.
- Confiscate and Destroy Property. Material, plants, animals, facilities and other goods that have been determined to be harmful to human health can be confiscated and destroyed.
- Issue Universal Prescription Orders. These orders reduce the time required to dispense prophylaxis and vaccines to affected or potentially affected persons by providing a universal prescription for their use among citizens in a specific locality or state.
- Designate Vaccination and Prophylaxis Dispensing Facilities. Using these authorities, state and local agencies may authorize specific facilities or elements of a Modular Medical Emergency System to dispense medicine to affected persons, freeing hospitals and other medical facilities to deal with symptomatic patients.
Public health strategies for isolation, quarantine and the confiscation and destruction of property may be conducted on a voluntary basis or be compelled on a mandatory basis through legal authority. When using state or local authorities, these public health strategies are typically issued as court orders or warrants and are carried out by the appropriate law enforcement agency. Both isolation and quarantine can require confinement to an individual’s home, a hospital, a medical center, or another facility designated by local, state or federal officials. In hazardous conditions, law enforcement officers and medical personnel are required to use appropriate personal protective gear when issuing isolation or quarantine orders. Depending on the nature of biohazard situation, these personnel may also receive vaccines.
In addition, in order to prevent the interstate spread of disease, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services may take appropriate federal actions using the authorities granted by U.S.C. title 42, 42 CFR parts 70 and 71, and 21 CFR 1240. State, local, and tribal assistance with the implementation and enforcement of isolation and/or quarantine actions is utilized if federal authorities are invoked. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has similar authorities related to the inspection, confiscation and destruction of food and animal products. Animals and farms can also be subject to legal authorities involving isolation and quarantine.
Use of these strategies has significant implications for the transportation system, and could result in any of the following situations:
- Voluntary and enforced travel restrictions for an affected area or from an affected area.
- "Snow day" conditions, including suspension of work, schools, and public gatherings in an affected community.
- Closures of highways, passenger transportation systems, arterials, bridges, tunnels, turnpikes and toll roads and re-routing of all area-wide traffic around affected area.
- Modal shifts and/or re-routing of freight transportation around affected area.
- Creation of ad hoc transportation systems to support movement of prophylaxis, other medical supplies, equipment, food and water, and medical and public safety personnel to specified locations near or within an affected area.
- Creation of ad hoc transportation systems to support the movement of potentially affected persons to centers for medical evaluation, vaccination and prophylaxis.
- Enforced curfews/quarantines in affected areas, with access and egress controlled through barricades and checkpoints.
- Creation of ad hoc transportation system to support a Modular Emergency Medical System established within an affected area.
These activities may be coordinated with not only state and local law enforcement and public health, but also with the National Guard. Other state and federal medical response teams may also be used, such as the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT) and the Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams (DMORT). Activation of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) under the auspices of the U.S. Public Health Service may be required.
The potential introduction of biohazards into livestock and crops is managed by local, county, state and federal departments of agriculture and veterinary medicine and other federal agencies with responsibility for regulating the import and trade of livestock, plants and agricultural goods. Existing detection and surveillance programs, inspections, research and training support the safety of livestock and foods.
There are several response options in the event of contamination, ranging from isolation of affected livestock and crops, to vaccination of livestock, to quarantines established around affected farms, facilities or production centers. In the event of quarantine, typically the depopulation and destruction of livestock and crops is required, along with indemnity payments to farmers, and immediate suspension of trade.
Implications for the transportation system may include:
- Support for restricted access to farms, facilities and processing centers.
- Support for decontamination of affected facilities, vehicles and locations.
- Support for shipping/disposal of biohazard waste materials.
- Inspections, advisories and enforcement to prevent movement of contaminated livestock/food products.
- Public information and rumor control.
- On-going coordination with motor carriers and railroads, public health agencies, and agricultural officials.
- Mode shifts or restrictions (if needed).
Additional support may be obtained in managing these situations from enforcement personnel within local, state and federal departments of agriculture, as well as the Veterinary Medical Assistance Teams (VMAT) and the Regional Emergency Animal Disease Eradication Organization (READEO) under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
4.0 Transportation Authorities
This section of the Transportation Biohazard Operational Concept should identify state DOT authorities in supporting response to a biohazard event. Authorities should be specified, including references to state codes, enabling legislation, or other statutes.
In developing this section, state DOTs may want to consider two types of authorities: emergency and other.
Emergency authorities may include:
- Closure and re-opening of transportation facilities, services and equipment.
- Coordination of travel restrictions into/out of the state or an affected area within the state.
- Coordination of traffic and access control points, barricades, and checkpoints to control traffic into/out of an affected area or location.
- Issuance of highway clearances, permits, and waivers for equipment, personnel, and contaminated materials (to support removal of carcasses, contaminated plant matter and foodstuffs, etc.).
- Coordination of and support for emergency evacuation and population re-location, including contra-flow operations, public transit systems, and the management of pedestrians on roadways.
- Coordination of transportation for victims to support mass casualty management and care operations.
- Delivery support for medicine, medical supplies, and medical personnel related to the Strategic National Stockpile and/or other mass prophylaxis sources.
- Coordination of transportation services to bring “worried well” and potentially affected persons to vaccination and prophylaxis dispensing sites, Neighborhood Emergency Help Centers, or other locations.
- Coordination of transportation services for special populations, including persons with disabilities, incarcerated persons, children in daycare centers and schools, the elderly, and those who may be ill or infirm (not related to the biohazard situation).
- Emergency procurement, including equipment and services necessary to support implementation of public health strategies, removal of contaminated materials, and decontamination of transportation facilities and equipment.
- Coordination of refrigerated vehicles and facilities to support medical and/or mortuary operations.
- Damage assessment (from contamination, lost revenue, etc.) and specialized engineering services.
- Hazardous Materials clean-up and decontamination.
Other authorities may include:
- Traffic monitoring.
- Traffic routing, diversion and detours.
- Freight management, including interstate and intrastate commerce, through coordination with commercial motor vehicle carriers, pipelines, airports, ports, railroads, and freight and transportation logistics associations.
- Authorities or responsibilities specified in mutual aid agreements.
- Authorities or responsibilities specified in agreements with public works and utilities agencies and companies.
- Authorities or responsibilities specified Memorandum of Agreement/Understanding with state and local emergency responders.
- Support provided for maintaining passenger transportation systems or creating ad hoc systems to serve specific functions.
- Public information.
5.0 Planning Situations and Assumptions
This section of the Transportation Biohazard Concept of Operations describes the planning situations and assumptions used by the state DOT in establishing its biohazard response capabilities. In developing this section, the state DOT may wish to incorporate some or all of the following situations and assumptions:
- A disease outbreak of exceptional nature could occur affecting the citizens served by the state DOT transportation network.
- Contamination of livestock and/or agricultural food products or water supply could occur, disrupting the supply and movement of these products and threatening the lives and well-being of citizens served by the transportation network.
- The transportation network could function to spread a deliberately released biological agent or could be a target of a deliberate release.
- Deliberate releases involving the transportation network may or may not be detected at the time of release.
- Overt releases may be announced in written, telephone or email/website communications or they may be observed by transportation personnel.
- Transportation personnel are trained in recognizing suspicious packages, conditions, behavior and equipment on transportation property.
- Procedures have been developed for reporting and investigating suspicious packages, conditions, behavior and equipment and making notification to local emergency response agencies.
- Covert releases most likely will not be identified until symptoms begin presenting in affected individuals and they are examined and treated by the medical community.
- The state DOT will rely on local, state and federal resources to identify biological agents and develop treatment and decontamination protocols, and to develop emergency response plans within appropriate local, state and federal authorities.
- The state DOT will support these plans and actions through activation of existing transportation plans, mutual aid agreements, and by making requests to other transportation systems and agencies.
- In the event the state DOT is overwhelmed (through absenteeism or sick employees), it may implement its Continuity of Operations plan.
- Notification of the activation of the Continuity of Operations plan will be given to the appropriate local/regional/state agencies.
- Minimum essential functions will still be performed.
- Other situations may emerge in which state DOT employees or organizational elements are located within areas of restricted mobility or quarantine. In these situations, transportation employees may be able to support services within the restricted area.
- Based on current capabilities, local jurisdictions within the state’s transportation network anticipate that, at a minimum, support will be required from mutual aid partners and the state for reception and movement of medical supplies, equipment and personnel. State DOT support may be requested to aid in the movement and distribution of these resources.
- Local jurisdictions within the state’s transportation network assume that the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) will be available through requests and will be delivered through a strategy established by the affected jurisdiction in coordination with appropriate state and federal officials.
- The state DOT will be available to support transportation and distribution of SNS resources, as specified in the terms of cooperative agreements established with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and other state and local agencies.
- Based on current capabilities, local jurisdictions within the state’s transportation network also anticipate that support will be required for traffic control, logistics, law enforcement, crowd control, and other activities associated with implementation of certain public health strategies that restrict or limit mobility. State DOT support may be requested for these functions.
- Local jurisdictions within the state’s transportation network assume that disease surveillance will provide information such as trends, patient presentations, signs and symptoms, lab results and clinical diagnoses that will be critical to an effective response. Based on the results of this surveillance, the state DOT will provide information and support to manage transportation in and around any affected areas.
- Figure 7 (on the next page) identifies the basic response activities to be performed in response to a biohazard event. For the most part, these activities are managed by local/regional/state public health agencies and local/state law enforcement.
- Figure 8 (in the right-hand column) identifies whether transportation support may be required to perform these basic response activities.
- Below, a brief discussion is provided for each response activity to illustrate how the state DOT may coordinate with local, regional and state public health, law enforcement and emergency management authorities to support these activities within its available resources.
Figure 8: Transportation Support Required for Public Health Response Activities
| Response Activity | Transportation Support |
|---|---|
| Medical Surveillance | Possible |
| Medical Diagnosis | No |
| Epidemiological Investigation | Possible |
| Criminal Investigation | Possible |
| Activation of Mass Prophylaxis Request/Distribution Plan | Likely |
| Residual Hazard Assessment and Mitigation | Possible |
| Control of Affected Area/Population | Likely |
| Care of Casualties | Likely |
| Emergency Management Operations | Likely |
| Fatality Management | Possible |
| Resource and Logistic Support | Likely |
| Continuity of Infrastructure | Possible |
| Family Support Services | No |
d Figure 7: Public Health Response to Biohazard Events
In providing support for a biohazard emergency, the state DOT assumes the following:
- Medical surveillance needs to operate continuously and provide non-specific detection of medical activities above established baselines in order to improve the chances of detecting unusual medical events sooner rather than later. Transportation agencies may identify suspicious substances or conditions, or experience unexplained illnesses among employees, that should be reported to appropriate law enforcement and/or public health officials.
- Preliminary medical diagnosis would be undertaken locally with samples sent to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, or other state, or local specialty laboratories for identification and confirmation. Transportation has no role in this function.
- Epidemiological investigation would include interviews and diagnoses to determine the distribution of medical cases. Since transportation can be the target or vector in a biohazard release, the state DOT will provide resources and personnel to support investigation, inspection, testing, and evaluation as needed. Transportation also has access to freight management information systems to support tracking of potentially contaminated goods or vehicles. Finally, transportation personnel will ensure safe access for medical investigators to transportation facilities and equipment.
- Criminal investigation, in addition to meeting the law enforcement needs in the event of an intentional release, could complement the epidemiological investigation. The results of these multiple investigations would be utilized by local officials to first assess whether a major health event is occurring, and then to help determine the potential cause and identify the population at risk. Transportation will support these investigations as needed.
- Medical prophylaxis involves the distribution and medical application of appropriate antibiotics, vaccines, or other medications in order to prevent disease and death in exposed victims. Because of uncertainties as to who was exposed, treatment may be applied to a much greater number of people than those actually exposed and may even be given to the entire city population. Transportation will be required to obtain, store, and move medical equipment and medicine, perhaps requiring refrigerated vehicles. This is particularly likely if a request is made for medicines from the Strategic National Stockpile. The state DOT will support/coordinate this function as needed and as specified in the terms of cooperative and mutual aid agreements among local, state and federal agencies.
- Residual hazard assessment and mitigation encompasses a set of activities that would assess and protect the population from further exposure to the biohazard agent. The risks from residuals are small compared to the prime attack but may still warrant attention. Assessment and mitigation can include environmental sampling, decontamination, and insect and animal control measures as applicable. State DOTs will support this activity through the provision of traffic control (at a specific location), traffic and freight information, access to available hazardous materials clean-up contractors, engineering support (if needed) and management of clearances and waivers for the shipment of contaminated materials.
- Control of affected area and population is divided into two major sub-elements: physical control and public information and rumor control. Physical control would provide crowd control and security at hospitals, emergency medical facilities, fatality handling sites, and other vital installations such as airports, utility sites, bridges, and tunnels, as well as patrol of affected areas to maintain security. Physical control would extend to enforcing isolation and quarantine orders and supporting social distancing strategies. Public information and rumor control would inform and instruct the population in ways that enhance emergency response and avoid panic. Particular attention would be needed to provide reliable information and subject matter experts to the media to avoid panic and the need for media to find their own “experts” who may provide inaccurate or sensationalized information. State DOTs will support this activity through coordinating the provision of vehicles, barricades, traffic control devices, personnel, traffic information, traffic management services, and transportation public information systems. Facilities, services or equipment may need to be closed. In the event that the National Guard or other agencies require clearances or waivers for vehicles, the state DOT will provide them. Depending on the location of the affected area, the state DOT may have/be able to provide on-going aerial and video surveillance to law enforcement agencies. Mobility restriction for an affected area could also require significant re-routing of traffic around the affected area to ensure the on-going mobility for freight transportation. Affected areas will also require supplying – for food, water and other items. State DOTs will coordinate with state and local agencies to ensure that access routes are available for these critical resources.
- Control and operation of the Modular Emergency Medical System, along with medical prophylaxis, forms the backbone of effective response to a biohazard emergency. To cope with potentially high numbers casualties and those that think they are casualties (the worried well) the Modular Emergency Medical System may be established. Under this concept, public and private area hospitals would admit casualties until they approach full capacity while operating under their internal emergency operations plans. Existing clinics would be expanded into neighborhood emergency help centers (NEHC) to provide the primary point of entry into the emergency medical system for biohazard patients and the worried well. These centers would provide triage and distribute medical prophylaxis, medications, and self-help information. A community outreach function would be performed by law enforcement, firefighters, community health personnel, and other officials to link home-bound patients to these centers. Community outreach personnel would provide limited medical care by mobilizing citizen home care efforts and would assist in quickly distributing medical prophylaxis and self- help information. Acute care centers (ACC) would be established in structures close to the area hospitals to provide definitive and supportive care for acutely ill patients that exceed hospital capacity. Hospital patients not affected by the biohazard situation and that were not in a critical condition could be moved to other hospitals outside of the impacted area in order to provide additional hospital space for biohazard patients. The state DOT appreciates the critical mission performed by the Modular Emergency Medical System during a biohazard emergency. The state DOT will provide/coordinate transportation resources to support this system, including vehicles, traffic information, traffic management services, traffic control devices, signage and public information.
- When state or local officials decide that a major health event is occurring, they will activate command, coordinating and public information systems through the implementation of NIMS requirements for the Incident Command System/Unified Command/Area Command in the field; state and local Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) to coordinate resources and strategies among and between levels of government; and an integrated public information system to ensure a consistent message to the public and media. Within this structure, a unified medical branch will be established, and representatives from local, state, and federal agencies will be requested at the local and state EOCs. The state DOT has developed an Incident Management System compliant with NIMS to integrate effectively into field response led by public health and public safety responders. The state DOT will assign representatives to the appropriate local and state EOCs, and will also coordinate with these EOCs from the State Transportation Emergency Operations Center.
- Resource and logistic support will ensure that mobilization centers and distribution points are established for incoming supplies. In most cases, a central reception center would receive incoming State and Federal support personnel and provide instructions, accreditation and assignments. This process will follow the procedures specified in the local and state Emergency Operations Plans and in the National Response Plan. In a major biohazard emergency, it is likely that most, if not all, 15 of the Emergency Support Functions under the National Response Plan would be activated. The state DOT will perform its resource and logistic support functions as designated in these plans.
- Fatality management includes the conversion of local or regional morgues to provide rapid central processing of remains and the establishment of long-term storage facilities using refrigerated containers to hold remains for final disposition. State DOTs will support this function through coordinating the provision of vehicles, facilities and clearances/waivers to move contaminated remains.
- Continuity of infrastructure may be necessary to activate local continuity of operations plans when disaster-related absenteeism exceeded critical thresholds. The state DOT has developed a continuity of operations capability and plan, and has identified minimum functions to be performed, lines of succession, delegations of emergency authority, alternate facilities, and procedures for communicating with employees, supporting critical transportation systems, and protecting critical records and information.
- Family support services would provide information hotlines and implement central coordination of volunteer service organizations. Due to the confidential nature of this activity, it is unlikely that state DOTs would play much of a role.
6.0 Transportation Role in Biohazard Event
This section of the Transportation Biohazard Operational Concept identifies the activities that may be performed by the state DOT in response to a biohazard emergency. State DOTs may want to use some or all of the following information in developing this section for their operational concepts.
This section presents the activities to be performed by the state DOT during a biohazard emergency. Standard phases of emergency management are used to guide transportation activities for a biohazard event. These phases include:
- Awareness
- Prevention
- Preparedness
- Response
- Recovery
Awareness
Activities performed by the state DOT to ensure awareness regarding biohazard events include the following:
- Maintaining access to/participating in local/regional/state threat warning systems.
- Build relationships with local, regional, and State Emergency Management Agencies (EMAs), Emergency Operations Center (EOC) managers and personnel, and Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) and State Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs).
- Will enhance their understanding of the transportation agency and the agency’s ability to provide supporting services.
- Participating in local/regional/state joint terrorism task forces and other preparedness organizations.
- Establishing direct electronic connectivity to local/county and regional/state 911 Centers and Emergency Operations Centers.
- Building relationships with local and state law enforcement.
- Building relationships with local and state departments of public health and agriculture/veterinary medicine.
- Obtaining security clearances for key leadership positions.
- Establishing protocols for employee/contractor notification and reporting of threatened/suspicious/actual biohazard events.
- Establishing protocols for heightened Homeland Security Advisory System threat levels.
- Build relationships with the U.S. military and intelligence communities.
Prevention
Activities performed by the state DOT to address prevention regarding biohazard events include the following:
- Training employees to support transportation biohazard event detection and verification in transportation facilities (i.e., suspicious conditions, packages, behavior and equipment).
- Implementing protocols for heightened Homeland Security Advisory System threat levels.
- Deploying detection and surveillance technology.
- Coordinating with law enforcement during periods of heightened threat levels.
- Distributing bulletins and special orders to employees regarding threat levels/conditions.
- Addressing security in special events planning and coordination.
- Developing plans for the pre-deployment of resources.
- Perform “all hazards” mitigation activities to address natural disasters and other potential emergencies:
- Land use and management
- Engineering assessments
- Development and adherence to local and state codes and federal regulations
- Application of special materials and designs to prevent flooding
- Control wildfires
- Reduce the impacts of earthquakes, hurricanes and tsunamis, etc.
- Perform threat and vulnerability assessment
- Security reviews performed on plans, designs, blueprints and specifications.
- Use of CCTV video recording and archival considerations
- Perform specific training, equipment procurement or other activities designed to focus on prevention by employees.
Preparedness
Activities performed by the state DOT to ensure preparedness for biohazard events include the following:
- Developing plans and procedures:
- Transportation Emergency Operations Plan, supporting plans and procedures.
- Transportation Incident Management System.
- Memorandum of Understanding/Agreement with other local and state agencies.
- Mutual Aid Agreements and notification/information sharing protocols with local/regional and state partners.
- Continuity of Operations Plan.
- Operational Concepts for Emergency Transportation Operations and Biohazard Events.
- Coordinating with local/regional and state agencies regarding the development of local/regional and state Emergency Operations Plans and Annexes.
- Establishing expectations regarding transportation functions during a range of potential biohazard scenarios.
- Coordinating with local/regional and state agencies to address the needs of special populations during biohazard events (disabled, elderly, school children, and inmates).
- Coordinating with contractors to identify resources they may have available to support emergency response, and to ensure their willingness to use them during an emergency.
- Establishing employee and contractor training and exercise programs.
- Participating in joint multi-agency training and exercises.
- Establishing emergency response capabilities:
- Developing 24/7 event notification protocols.
- Developing extended/emergency staffing plans, including the suspension of vacation and leave.
- Developing call trees/employee notification systems.
- Developing employee emergency communications systems.
- Preparing employee communication strategy and materials for distribution in advance of an actual biohazard event.
- Developing single-point-of-contact notification systems for contractors and work zones.
- Developing communication capabilities with other local, regional, and state response agencies.
- IT/GIS continuity of operations capabilities
- Employing the use of transportation CCTV and aerial surveillance policies to ensure that situations observed by transportation personnel are relayed effectively to appropriate responders.
- Establishing an up-to-date inventory of transportation resources, accessible from multiple locations, and shared, as appropriate with local/state emergency management agencies and other organizations.
- Addressing biohazard waste removal, transportation and disposal in programs and contracts for hazardous materials clean-up programs.
- Coordinating with local, state and federal agencies to identify decontamination requirements and standards for vehicles that may need to be re-used quickly in the field. Also, investigate longer-term decontamination requirements for enclosed facilities, outdoor areas, and other transportation equipment.
- Establishing transportation decontamination and recertification protocols for vehicles used to support field operations.
- Coordinating with interagency working groups or other organizations established to address decontamination issues in local, regional and state communities
- Engaging foreign language speakers to special populations and address the need for plans and procedures to communicate with citizens who may not understand English.
Technology
- During a biohazard event, the state DOT is committed to using deployed technology to support its mission:
- Signal and ramp controls.
- CCTV and traffic monitoring capabilities.
- Variable message signs.
- Phone and Internet-based traveler information systems.
- Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) that coordinate a wide range of operations equipment (e.g., integration of signals, cameras, radios, web sites, HOV/Managed lanes, message signs, and highway advisory radio).
- GIS technology
- CAD integration technology
Response
Activities performed by the state DOT to respond to biohazard events include the following:
Notification
- Receiving notifications from activated elements of the local/regional/state response structure.
- Classifying the biohazard situation using the transportation agency’s Emergency Activation Levels.
- Making appropriate notifications to transportation personnel based on the Emergency Activation Level and requests from activated public health, emergency management, and public safety responders.
- Notification to/activation of the state DOT Emergency Operations Center.
Coordination
- Assigning personnel to local/regional and state Emergency Operations Center(s) to coordinate with and assist other agencies.
- Providing situation assessment regarding the status of the transportation network, including real-time traffic data and traffic reports for roads within the affected area or on roads leading into/from the area.
- Providing CCTV surveillance of these locations (if possible).
- Assisting state and local government entities in determining the most viable response strategies using transportation networks and assets to, from, and within the affected area.
Resource Support
- Providing all available and obtainable transportation resource support including:
- Prioritizing needs and available resources.
- Transportation equipment, e.g., passenger and utility vans, buses, trucks and/or trailers; aircraft, aircrews, ground and operations personnel, and communications for transportation of emergency officials.
- Transportation facilities, e.g., vehicle repair facilities, equipment, and personnel; fleet parking and storage areas to be used for staging, parking, and storage of emergency vehicles; motor pool and vehicle service facilities and personnel for refueling and servicing emergency vehicles.
- Vehicular traffic management and control signs and devices e.g., barriers, cones of various types, etc.
- Vehicular traffic flow data and information from permanent and temporary monitoring sites.
- Access to transportation contracts for hazardous materials clean-up services.
- Access to transportation’s emergency procurement capabilities for other needed equipment, supplies or services.
- Activating mutual aid agreements and other agreements as necessary to obtain additional resources and capabilities.
- Performing traffic management:
- Identify specific traffic management actions to implement and monitor community response strategies, including traffic control points, access control points, barricade plans and check points.
- Coordinate the closure of highways, arterials, bridges, tunnels, or sections of roadway.
- Implement traffic control strategies for restricted mobility and restricted access.
- Coordinate with transportation and contractor personnel to ensure the removal of work zones and other temporary capacity restrictions in or near an affected area, or on detour/diversion routes.
- Provide any highway clearances, waivers and permits required to expedite the transportation of high-priority materials and personnel or to move contaminated materials.
- Assign appropriate personnel at key field locations to oversee operations and to provide consistent, verified information on the transportation network.
- Provide situation updates to jurisdictions near the affected area and coordinate traffic control strategies with these jurisdictions.
- Monitor and control transportation systems and infrastructure, and coordinate transportation activities with other agencies (local, state, and federal).
Support for Emergency Responders
- Implementing emergency responder and public health access and priority strategies (access control points, checkpoints, closures, barricades, etc.).
- Coordinating traffic management, signage, control devices, placement of vehicles and personnel to support restricted mobility conditions, including curfews, voluntary “snow days”, quarantines, etc.
- Supporting delivery of medical supplies, medicines, and medical personnel, including requests from the Strategic National Stockpile, to specific locations near or within the affected area.
- Coordinating the provision of specialized resources, such as refrigerated trucks or facilities, to store medicines and supplies.
- Routing traffic/emergency access points to support the Modular Emergency Medical System, or other structure, established to manage affected citizens and the worried well (Neighborhood Emergency Help Centers, Acute Care Centers, Hospitals, private clinics, etc.).
- Coordinating transportation to provide an ad hoc service to bring affected citizens and worried well to sites for medical evaluation, vaccination and dispensation of prophylaxis, and to return them to their homes.
- Coordinating transportation support and community outreach for special populations, such as persons with disabilities, the elderly, school children and incarcerated persons.
- Supporting on-scene management and disposal of biohazard waste and the decontamination of facilities, vehicles and equipment.
- Supporting requests from local, regional, state and federal agencies.
- Determining that emergency response is no longer necessary and the event has ended.
Support for the Public
- Coordinating delivery strategies, vehicles, distribution systems and security to provide resources and support to the public within an affected or restricted area (i.e., food, water, supplies, etc.).
- Monitoring the impacts of the event on the flow of goods into and around the affected area, ensuring sufficient supplies are available for the affected public.
- Coordinating with suppliers and shippers to assess the time required to procure and deliver certain resources necessary to sustain the affected area.
- Coordination with local, state, federal and non-governmental agencies supporting the needs of the affected public.
Other
- Managing Area Wide Transportation
- Routing/detouring traffic around affected area.
- Coordinating with other transportation districts/networks regarding shifts in traffic control and likely demand.
- Managing freight transportation, including mode and location shifts brought about by the biohazard event.
- Supporting agency-wide communications:
- Provide communications resources in support of state-wide operations.
- Providing public information on the status of the transportation system:
- Coordinate with public information function established by responding agencies.
- Coordinate with media outlets and traffic reporting agencies.
- Prepare press releases.
- Update Internet information.
- Deploy traffic control devices and variable message signs.
- Update highway advisory radio.
- Update 511 traveler information system.
- Make motor carrier, railroad and bus notifications.
- Update road condition reports.
- Deploy signage and barricades.
- In the event of a situation of known threat or projected release over a defined area, the transportation agency will support:
- Evacuation of threatened populations to areas of safety/host locations.
- Evacuation/movement of special populations (school children, persons with disabilities, elderly, incarcerated persons, ambulatory patients in hospitals, etc.) to areas of safety/host locations.
- Incident management along evacuation routes.
- “Hot wash”/after-action briefing.
Recovery
Activities performed by the state DOT to support recovery from biohazard events include the following:
- Performing/supporting damage assessments for contaminated facilities and equipment to justify the receipt of federal Stafford Act and Emergency Relief funding.
- Performing permanent repairs/decontamination.
- Routing and permitting of recovery equipment, materials and contaminated debris.
- Public reassurance.
- Restoration of transportation system.
- Evaluating alternatives and making choices regarding activities to take for restoration and recovery.
- Ensuring that a formal after action report and improvement plan are developed and incorporate results of these documents back into the transportation agency’s activities for awareness, prevention, preparedness, response and recovery
7.0 Direction and Control
This section of the Transportation Biohazard Operational Concept describes the system of direction and control that will be used by the state DOT to perform the activities identified in the previous section. State DOTs may wish to use some or all of the following information in preparing this section of their operational concept.
The state DOT will manage its response to a biohazard emergency using the following tools and structures:
- Emergency Activation Levels
- Transportation Incident Management System
- District, Regional, and state-wide Transportation Emergency Operations Center
Emergency Activation Levels
In the state DOT’s Emergency Operations Plan, Emergency Activation Levels (EALs) are used to categorize transportation emergency response requirements. EALs support event notification, deployment of resources, and coordination and communication with external agencies. EALs also identify who will be in charge of the state DOT’s response to the emergency. EALs include:
- Level One: Traffic Incident – an incident that is within the capabilities of a one DOT maintenance section or other business unit to handle. Limited support may be required from external agencies.
- Level Two: District-wide Emergency – an event which affects more than one DOT maintenance section or business unit within a District or more than one facility. Response to this incident may require activation of the District Emergency Center. Significant support may be required from external agencies within the District.
- Level Three: Region-wide Emergency – an event that affects more than one District within a region. Response to this incident may require activation of the Region-wide Emergency Center. Significant support may be required from external agencies within the Region.
- Level Four: Major Emergency – a significant, possibly state-wide emergency in which there is an immediate threat to life and property, where both the state Emergency Operations Center and the state DOT Emergency Operations Center have been activated. Significant support may be required from multiple external agencies throughout the state and possibly from the federal government.
Typically, the District Manager with authority for the location that has experienced the emergency will determine the EAL. Emergencies that require activation of the state Emergency Operations Center are automatically considered Level Four emergencies. The state DOT assumes that most biohazard events would require Level Three or Level Four activation.
Based on the declaration of a Level Three or Level Four emergency, the affected District, Region, or Headquarters Division will establish Emergency Operations Centers and make notifications using the process specified in the state DOT Emergency Operations Plan. This will include, as appropriate, notifications to the state Emergency Operations Center and Emergency Management Agency (if the state Emergency Operations Center is not yet activated), to local and state law enforcement and other responders, to traffic management centers and transportation operations centers, to motor carriers and railroads, to pipelines and airport and transit system, and to the traveling public.
During a biohazard event, the state DOT will continue to operate as a statewide organization with the same chain of command and communications as in normal operations. However, emergency operations may be conducted on a 24-hour basis and may require the adjustment of some headquarters functions and staffs. At the Region and District level, reassignment of field staff and adjustments of assigned duties may be needed.
Who’s in Charge
The District Manager or designee is responsible for managing the state DOT’s response to Level One (Traffic Incident) and Level Two (District-wide) emergencies. For fixed facilities, the Facilities Manager or designee is responsible.
The Region Manager or designee is responsible for managing the DOT’s response to Level Three (Region-wide) emergencies. If an emergency affects two Districts in different Regions, the Region Managers of the two Regions will determine who should be charge. Or, they may opt to establish a shared command of the response.
Overall responsibility for providing DOT services during Level Four rests with the DOT statewide Maintenance Engineer or designee. The Office of Maintenance will manage DOT resources and equipment and coordinate DOT activities through the state Emergency Operations Center, if it is activated.
State DOT Incident Management System
The state DOT will use the Incident Management System specified in its Emergency Operations Plan and procedures to direct its response activities in the field, at the Transportation Emergency Operations Center, and at local/state Emergency Operations Centers. The state DOTs Incident Management System enables direct interface with the command and coordinating structures established by local responders and emergency management agencies, including:
- Incident Command System (i.e., single, unified or area command) for field response.
- Local and state Emergency Operations Centers, using pre-designated Emergency Support Functions to coordinate delivery of resources to the affected area.
- Integrated Public Information System, to ensure a consistent message is provided to the public and the media.
- Other command and coordinating structures as identified in the National Response Plan, the National Incident Management System, and state and local Emergency Operations Plan.
The Transportation Incident Management System addresses the roles of:
- Transportation field response structure:
- Transportation front-line employees;
- Transportation supervisors;
- Transportation Incident Commander;
- Transportation Incident Command Post; and
- Transportation Incident Management Team.
- Transportation coordinating structure:
- State-wide Transportation Emergency Operations Center;
- Regional Emergency Operations Center;
- District/Division Emergency Operations Centers; and
- Field Office Emergency Operations Centers.
- Transportation communications structure:
- State-wide Communications Center;
- District/Regional Traffic Management Center;
- District/Regional Transportation Dispatch Centers; and
- Field Office Dispatch Centers.
- Transportation coordination with local/state Emergency Operations Center:
- Assigned transportation personnel at these locations.
NOTE: The state DOT should identify specific responsibilities by job title and department. A sample listing appears below.
- Transportation manager and supporting department/division personnel in charge of Level Three (Region-wide) Emergencies:
- Transportation field response structure;
- Transportation coordinating structure;
- Transportation communications structure; and
- Transportation coordination with local/state Emergency Operations Center.
- Transportation manager and supporting department/division personnel in charge of Level Four (Major) Emergencies:
- Transportation field response structure;
- Transportation coordinating structure;
- Transportation communications structure; and
- Transportation coordination with local/state Emergency Operations Center.
- State-wide personnel in charge of activation and management of the state-wide Transportation Emergency Operations Center.
- Regional personnel in charge of activation and management of regional Transportation Emergency Operations Center.
- Specialized functions, such as emergency procurement, construction, engineering, and inventory control.
It is anticipated that responsibilities for coordinating state DOT resources in a biohazard event will be managed by the state-wide Transportation Emergency Operations Center, according to the procedures specified in the state and state DOT Emergency Operations Plans. Transportation resources will be classified using the Emergency Support Functions identified in the state Emergency Operations Plan:
- ESF #1 – Transportation.
- ESF #2 – Communications.
- ESF #3 – Infrastructure (Public Works and Engineering).
- ESF #4 – Firefighting.
- ESF #5 - Emergency Management.
- ESF #6 - Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services.
- ESF #7 - Resource Support.
- ESF #8 - Public Health and Medical Services.
- ESF #9 - Urban Search and Rescue.
- ESF #10 - Oil and Hazardous Materials Response.
- ESF #11 - Agriculture and Natural Resources.
- ESF #12 – Energy.
- ESF #13 - Public Safety and Security.
- ESF #14 - Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation.
- ESF #15 - External Affairs.
The state DOT should provide a brief description of its activities to coordinate these resources and reference the appropriate section of the state and state DOT Emergency Operations Plans.
8.0 Communications
This section of the Transportation Biohazard Operational Concept describes the communications system that will be used by the state DOT during a biohazard emergency. State DOTs may wish to use some or all of the following information in preparing this section of their operational concept.
Communications is the transfer and interpretation of information among persons, places, and machines. It includes transmission of information and data by phone, radio, fax, image, and electronic mail systems.
The state DOT has established defined protocols for information collection and communication among internal departments and with external agencies. These protocols are located in (reference description/procedures for state DOT’s communications systems and capabilities). They include:
- Transportation Agency Notification/Communication:
- State Emergency Response System;
- Highways;
- Motor carriers;
- Railroads;
- Public transit;
- Pipelines;
- Maritime pilotage; and
- Aviation.
- Transportation Operations Centers:
- State-wide;
- District/Division; and
- Field Office.
- Emergency Responder Notification/Communication:
- 911 dispatch center;
- Local, Regional and State Emergency Operations Centers;
- Field communications; and
- Agency-to-agency communications.
- Communication with the public using ITS technology and established systems such as the agencies website.
Protocols for state DOT communications with external agencies are defined in the state DOT’s Emergency Operations Plan.
9.0 Public information
This section of the Transportation Biohazard Operational Concept describes the public information system that will be used by the state DOT during a biohazard emergency. State DOTs may wish to use some or all of the following information in preparing this section of their operational concept.
Based on the EAL assigned to a biohazard event, the state DOT has developed procedures regarding the dissemination of information to the public. Public information dissemination should be handled by the state DOTs established media relations team.
Typical activities performed by state DOT Public Information Representatives include the following:
- Notification of the appropriate public information representative;
- Dispatch of the public information representative to an appropriate location for briefing and information collection;
- Notification and coordination with District, Region and Headquarters personnel regarding the release of information to the public;
- Prepara